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I. Introduction  
 
   The adoption of a policy of awarding financial aid based on merit, as opposed to 
strictly need-based aid, has become markedly more popular at private colleges and 
universities over the last two decades.  This increased use of merit aid by private colleges 
and universities has been a popular topic of discussion by educators, researchers and the 
press.  Merit aid is often used by many private colleges and universities seeking to 
increase their enrollments of high test score students in order to boost the quality of their 
student bodies.  It is well documented that test scores, such as SAT and ACT scores, are 
highly correlated with income and race.  Many fear that merit based awards will go 
mainly to higher income and non-minority students, leading to a decrease in the 
enrollment of low-income students, as well as possibly students from under-represented 
minority groups.  In a 2006 study, Heller estimates that greater than 60% of 
institutionally offered merit aid went to students with family incomes above the median, 
and 13% went to students from families earning greater than $125,000.  If financial aid 
funds must be split between merit-based awards and need-based aid and many if not most 
of the merit-based awards are going to higher-income students, there will be fewer funds 
available to subsidize the costs of attendance for low-income students.  This seems to be 
a reality for many financial aid offices - a 2003 study by the Lumina Foundation reports 
anecdotes from college administrators indicating that there is often a trade-off occurring 
between need and merit in financial aid decisions at some institutions.  
 However, it may be the case that the use of merit aid by private institutions does 
not have a negative impact on the enrollment of low-income students.  Some argue that 
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merit aid can actually help to improve the financial situation of an institution by bringing 
in more “almost full-pay” students (Bowen et. al, 2005).  In this case, on average the 
merit awards do go to higher income students, but they do not fully subsidize the cost of 
attendance and as enrollment goes up, net tuition revenues could go up as a result.  This 
increased revenue could then be used to increase the quality of the institution and/or to 
increase need-based financial aid.  The 2003 Lumina Foundation report shows that some 
colleges and universities report using merit aid as a tool to increase enrollment and fill 
their classes to capacity.  A 2006 case study examining one such institution showed that 
following the introduction of merit aid there was an increase in tuition revenues as well 
as an increase in the representation of low-income students (Scannell, 2006).    
There is also the concern that in order to provide merit aid, institutions might need 
to divert funds originally intended for other areas than just need-based aid, such as for 
increases in faculty salaries, or hiring of full-time faculty versus adjunct faculty.  
Colleges also might use increases in tuition or other fees such as room & board to cover 
the increase in spending on merit-based financial aid.  Diverting funds in these ways may 
impact educational outcomes and direct costs to students, and therefore it is important to 
understand how the introduction of merit-aid programs can affect spending patterns at 
institutions. 
This paper will help to shed light on these questions by first examining what 
factors influence an institution’s decision to begin offering merit-based aid.  The paper 
then continues by examining how the socio-economic and demographic composition of 
the student bodies at private four-year colleges and universities change following the 
introduction of a merit aid policy, and by investigating whether the use of merit aid is 
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successful in that its adoption is followed by increases in the quality of the student body 
and/or by enrolling larger classes.  Lastly, this paper explores what other spending trade-
offs institutions may be making in order to fund their merit awards.   
Private colleges and universities respond to low growth in the median SAT scores 
of their freshmen classes as compared to their peer institutions by introducing a merit aid 
program.  The results suggest that there is a decrease in the representation of low-income 
students after schools begin offering merit aid, and a redistribution of Black students 
from top schools to bottom ranked schools.  However, the sizes of these effects are 
different for colleges of different initial quality.  The use of merit aid is associated with 
modest gains in median SAT scores of the incoming class, particularly for middle tier 
colleges.  In terms of changes in spending in other areas, the use of merit aid is associated 
with an increase in tuition for middle and bottom tier schools, and a slight decrease in 
associate and full professor salaries at top-tier schools.  These results suggest that the use 
of merit-aid may lead to an increase in the under-representation of low-income and 
minority students at private four-year colleges and universities and that for some 
institutions funds may also be diverted to fund these scholarships which could result in 
negative impacts on student outcomes.   
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the literature in the area and 
discusses in more detail the questions I will test.  Section III contains descriptive 
statistics, followed by results in Section IV, and in Section V, I conclude. 
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II. Background  
 With the expansion in the use of merit-based financial aid, there has been an 
accompanying increase in research focused in this area.  However, at this point most 
research has focused on state merit aid programs and specifically, the Georgia HOPE 
scholarship.  This program was designed to increase enrollment of college-able students 
at colleges and universities in Georgia, and also to entice students to remain in state to 
pursue their post-secondary degrees.  As a result, much of the research focusing on this 
program and other state programs like it, have examined the enrollment impacts, and how 
these effects are distributed across different sub-populations of students1.  Singell and 
coauthors (2006) use Pell grant data to show that the introduction of the Georgia HOPE 
scholarship did lead to an increase in access to higher education for low-income students.  
However, in a 2000 paper, Dynarski shows that while the HOPE scholarship program 
was successful in its goal to increase enrollment, there was very little of an effect for low-
income and Black students who often were not eligible for the award due to low test 
scores.  A later paper examining similar merit aid programs in other states showed more 
favorable enrollment effects for Black and Hispanic students (Dynarski, 2003).  Results 
of another study examining the response of four-year colleges and universities to the 
introduction of the Georgia HOPE scholarship show that institutions reacted by 
increasing tuition and other fees (Long, 2004).  Although the Georgia HOPE scholarship, 
and other state programs like it, has very different goals, the results of these studies show 
that the impacts of merit-based aid may not be distributed evenly across income and race 
                                                 
1
 For other examples of work examining effects of the Georgia HOPE scholarship see Cornwell et al., 2006 
and Cornwell & Mustard, 2005.  
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groups.  These studies also provide evidence of one way in which institutions may 
respond to an increase in spending on aid – increases in tuition. 
 Research examining the effects of institutionally funded merit aid awards by four-
year colleges and universities is much more limited, mostly due to the scarcity of data on 
institutional spending on merit aid.  A 2006 paper by Ehrenberg, Zhang and Levin 
investigates how the use of institutionally funded National Merit Scholarships affects the 
enrollment of students that receive a Pell Grant.  Their results show that institutions that 
fund National Merit Scholarships for their enrolled students that have earned them enroll 
fewer Pell Grant recipients, a proxy for the number of low-income students.  Although 
this is a specific type of institutionally funded merit-based financial aid these results 
show that institutionally funded aid programs based on academic merit can lead to a 
crowd-out of lower-income students.   
 If the introduction of institutionally funded merit aid awards at private colleges 
and universities also leads to a reallocation of funds from other sources to financial aid, 
this may impact educational outcomes of students.  One possible way this could happen 
is if colleges or universities increase the use of part-time or adjunct faculty for teaching in 
order to cut costs on faculty salaries which may negatively impact students’ grades and 
persistence.  Ehrenberg and Zhang (2005) find that colleges or universities that employ 
more adjunct professors have lower persistence rates of students into their second year.  
Students that are taught mostly by this type of professor that by definition does not have 
as strong of a tie to the college or university, and in some cases may be less qualified than 
a tenure-track professor, may not be as satisfied with their academic experience and 
therefore are less likely to persist into their second year.  Using administrative data from 
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the public higher education system in Ohio, Bettinger and Long in a 2006 paper find 
similar evidence that taking more classes taught by adjunct professors is associated with 
lower persistence rates for students.  However, they find that there also might be some 
positive impacts of adjunct professors in that they can increase the probability of taking 
future courses in the subject taught, particularly in fields such as engineering and 
education (Bettinger & Long, 2007).  
 Institutions may also cut back on spending on faculty salaries in order to help 
fund merit aid awards.  Lower real faculty salaries, or smaller raises, could lead to an 
increase in turnover of high quality faculty who are already employed by the university 
(Ehrenberg et al., 1991).  Additionally, these colleges and universities will likely find 
hiring of high quality new faculty to be difficult as outside options will now be more 
attractive.  This could possibly lead to a decrease in faculty quality, which could in turn 
impact student outcomes.   This paper will examine how student body characteristics, 
faculty salaries, tuition and fees levels, and percent of the faculty that are adjuncts are 
impacted by the use of institutionally offered merit aid.  Additionally, I will investigate 
how the effect of merit aid on these outcomes may differ for colleges and universities of 
different quality levels.  The results shed light on the perhaps unintended consequences of 
merit-based financial aid. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 To examine the choice to offer merit aid and to evaluate the effects of the use of 
merit-based financial aid by private colleges and universities, this paper uses data from 
the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges for the years of 1987-2005.  Each year the 
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College Board sends a survey to institutions that includes a set of questions regarding 
their financial aid practices.  The survey specifically asks the institution to report if they 
award non-need based financial aid that is based on academic merit.  This paper focuses 
on private four-year colleges and universities as public colleges and universities are more 
limited in their control over their funding sources and spending.  I restrict the sample to 
private four-year colleges that report in the beginning of the sample period (1987) that 
they do not offer financial aid based on merit2.  By doing this, I have defined the set of 
133 private four-year schools that are “at-risk” of offering merit aid in order to compare 
characteristics before and after the addition of merit aid.  A majority of private four-year 
colleges and universities were already offering merit aid when the data window opens in 
1987 and as a result the remaining set of “at-risk” institutions is fairly small.  However, 
as much of the concern regarding the effects of merit aid policies are focused on the 
institutions that have switched to merit aid in the last two decades, this sample should 
capture the population of interest.  There are 40 schools that never begin offering aid and 
93 schools that begin offering merit aid during the nineteen year time period.  This paper 
follows these schools through the sample period, observing the year in which they begin 
offering aid.  This information is used to define at each point in time how many years an 
institution has offered merit aid. 
 Data on student body characteristics, institutional characteristics and spending are 
merged in from a number of sources.  The percentage of students receiving a Pell Grant is 
obtained from the Pell Grant Recipients data and is used to proxy for the percentage of 
low-income students at each institution in each year.  The racial composition of each 
                                                 
2
 The sample of private four-year colleges and universities excludes post-secondary institutions specializing 
in the study of music or the arts, and religious seminaries.  
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college or university is derived from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS), a product of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  
Measures of student body quality and application pool quality such as 75th percentile 
SAT scores and median SAT scores of incoming freshmen3, number of applicants, admit 
rate and yield rate come from the College Board data set, as does the percent of enrolled 
freshmen from outside the U.S.  Institutional costs and spending data, including tuition, 
room & board, and average salary by faculty rank, come from IPEDS.  Finally, the 
percent of faculty employed part-time is derived from IPEDS data.   
 Figure 1 shows the percentage of private four-year colleges and universities in the 
sample offering merit-based financial aid for each year in the sample period, 1987-2005.  
The trends are also shown for each tier.  Tiers are defined using median SAT scores of 
the student body at the start of the sample period to partition the complete sample of 
private four-year institutions into terciles.4  By definition, no institutions in the sample 
were offering merit aid in 1987.  There is a fairly steep and steady increase for the whole 
sample, and as a result, in 2005 about 70% of the colleges and universities in the sample 
have started offering merit aid.  The bulk of this increase comes from schools in the 
bottom and middle tiers, as about 50% of the top-tier schools report offering merit aid in 
2005, whereas over 90% of mid-tier schools offer merit aid in 2005.  One of the main 
hypothesized motivations behind the use of merit-based financial aid is to attract more 
                                                 
3
 What is referred to as the median SAT score is actually calculated as the midpoint of the interquartile 
range.  
4
 More specifically, the median SAT scores in 1987 of all private four-year colleges and universities 
reporting complete merit-aid data for the sample period, including those that offer merit for the entire 
period, were used to break the sample into terciles.  Bottom tier schools have SAT scores below 1020, 
Middle Tier schools have SAT scores between 1020 and 1110, and Top Tier schools have SAT scores 
greater than or equal to 1110.  All SAT scores prior to 1996 were re-centered using the crosswalk provided 
by the College Board.  If SAT scores were missing in 1987, 1988 values were used if available, or if not, 
SATs were imputed using expenditures per student, urbanicity, % residential, and student body size. 
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high ability students to enroll at one’s institution. Bottom and mid-tier schools have the 
most incentive to do this in order to move up in the hierarchy of private four-year 
colleges and universities by enrolling a higher quality student body.  However, top-tier 
colleges may decide to begin offering merit aid as a way to stay competitive and to retain 
high-ability students as more and more colleges around them are trying to steal these 
students away.  Figure 1 illustrates that there has been a strong movement by private 
four-year colleges and universities towards merit-based financial aid.  When weighted by 
the size of the undergraduate student body, the trends look very similar, showing that 
there is not a specific pattern over time to the size of schools that have decided to begin 
offering merit aid.   
 Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables of interest are shown in Tables 1a 
and 1b.  Mean values are reported for the beginning and end of the sample period, as is 
the percent change in each variable over the time period for the whole sample of schools 
and by tier.  The percentage of students receiving Pell Grants has increased by 15% over 
the sample period.  The majority of this increase has occurred in the mid-tier and bottom 
tier schools.  Although there has been a fairly large increase in percent Pell over the time 
period, low-income students still make up a much smaller proportion of the upper-tier 
schools; only 14% of the student body at top tier schools as compared to almost 48% at 
bottom tier schools.  The percentage of Hispanic students enrolled has grown 
significantly over time, and the bulk of this increase has occurred at mid-tier and top tier 
schools.  Despite the increases, in 2005 Hispanic students made up only 5% of the 
student bodies at the schools in the sample.  There is a very similar pattern for the 
increase in representation of Asian students. Although there has been very little increase 
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in the percentage of Black students enrolled at schools in the sample, there have been 
large percentage increases in the top two tiers.  Black students are much more highly 
represented in the student bodies at bottom tier schools than at top tier schools, 31% in 
the bottom tier versus only 5 % in the top tier. 
 Applicant pools have increased quite a bit over the sample period, especially at 
bottom tier schools (over 100%).  However they are still significantly larger at top tier 
schools.  This is hardly surprising, as the top tier colleges are the most in demand by 
students, especially high ability students, and they are also on average larger schools with 
more slots for freshmen students.  It may also be that this jump in applications for middle 
tier schools is partly driven by the increased use of the common application by these 
schools (Liu, et. al, 2007).  Although the applicant pool has grown steadily, the size of 
the freshmen class has not grown at the same rate.  As a result, admit rates have fallen 
over time.  Interestingly, yield rates have also fallen over time.  This may also be a result 
of the “apply everywhere” philosophy that seems to have taken hold in recent years.  
Admitted students may have more options of where to enroll, and therefore the 
probability of enrolling a particular admitted student may be falling.  Schools in the 
sample enroll a small percentage of foreign freshmen, 4% in 2005, but there has been an 
increase over time for the bottom and top tier schools.  The majority of the student bodies 
at the schools in the sample are composed of full-time students and this percentage has 
increased slightly over time for all schools.    
 In terms of charges, both room & board and tuition have increased significantly 
during the sample period.  Changes in room & board charges have been comparable 
across tiers, at around a 20-30% change in charges, although the average charges do go 
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up as you move up a tier5.  Tuition charges follow the same pattern in terms of means, but 
the large increases in tuition have occurred mostly at the bottom and middle tier colleges 
and universities.  Despite these big increases in the bottom two tiers, the tuition levels at 
top tier schools are still significantly higher, with an average of almost $30,000 for top 
tier schools in 2005 versus only $13,000 at bottom tier schools and $21,000 at middle tier 
schools.   
 Colleges in all three tiers have seen similar percent increases in average faculty 
salaries.  As with tuition, top tier colleges and universities have much higher average 
salaries at every rank than do colleges and universities from the bottom two tiers.  Top 
tier schools employ more of their faculty full-time than do schools from the bottom two 
tiers.  On average, 24% of the faculty at top-tier schools is employed part-time, versus 
44-48% at bottom and middle tier schools. 
 The descriptive statistics in Tables 1a & 1b show that for both types of colleges in 
the main sample, those that begin offering aid at some point during the time period, and 
those that never do (for ease of discussion I will refer to them as Change and Never 
schools), there are definite time trends for all of the variables of interest.  This does not, 
however, tell us if the practice of offering merit aid affects these variables, and by how 
much.  Figure 2 shows the percentage of the student body that receives Pell Grants by the 
number of years since or until merit aid is first offered, for all of the Change schools and 
also separated by tier.  There are fewer schools with many years of observations before 
they began offering merit aid causing the trends to be very jumpy before year zero, and 
then smooth out considerably.  Despite the jumpy nature of the percentages before merit 
aid is offered, there is a distinct pattern that emerges at year 0.  For all three tiers there is 
                                                 
5
 All dollar amounts have been adjusted for inflation and are reported in constant 2005 dollars.   
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a somewhat steady increase in percent Pell in the years leading up to the introduction of 
the merit aid policy, and then starting at year zero, this incline flattens out and may even 
start to reverse about 10 years following the policy change.  This pattern, although not 
showing a strict decline in percent Pell following the policy change, does provide 
descriptive evidence that there was an effect on the income distribution of students 
following the switch to merit aid. 
 As mentioned previously, a likely main motivation for offering merit-based aid is 
to increase the quality of the student body by attracting more high-scoring students to 
enroll.  Figure 3 shows the median SAT scores of the incoming freshman class by the 
number of years until or since merit aid is first offered.  There is no clear pattern relating 
the number of years offering merit aid and the average median SAT scores, so perhaps 
these policies are if anything, only moderately successful in actually increasing the 
quality of the student body.  It is also possible that instead of increasing student body 
quality, the policies work to maintain student body quality such that in the absence of 
such a financial aid program the institutions would have experienced decreases in their 
median SAT scores.  A more formal regression analysis is required to examine this 
relationship.  The next section examines empirically whether the descriptive relationships 
that do appear remain after controlling for other characteristics.   
 
IV. Empirical Methods and Results 
A. Factors Affecting the Decision to Offer Merit Aid 
This paper has put forth a number of hypotheses in the introduction as to why 
private four-year colleges might begin to offer merit-based financial aid.  To examine the 
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factors that affect this choice I estimate a proportional hazards model for the decision to 
begin offering merit aid in each academic year.  Between each observed time period, 
institutions have the choice to continue not to offer merit aid or to begin offering merit 
aid.  This decision is modeled as a function of an institution’s own characteristics in the 
beginning of the time period and how these characteristics interact with those of peer 
institutions.   
Following the hypotheses outlined above there are two measures of particular 
interest.  If colleges notice that they are enrolling high ability students at a lower rate than 
their peer institutions, or in other words are experiencing slower growth in their median 
SAT scores than peer colleges, they may offer merit aid awards to increase their yield of 
high ability students.  Lower tier colleges may want to increase the quality of their 
student body, but could also have trouble filling their freshman classes and therefore may 
respond to low enrollment growth by introducing a merit aid program.  To investigate 
these two relationships I include indicators of whether the institution had lower growth in 
either median SAT scores or total undergraduate enrollment than their peer institutions 
and then include interactions of both measures with indicators for the tier of the college6. 
Hazard ratios from estimations of the probability of beginning to offer merit aid 
with several different peer group definitions are reported in Table 2.  Column 1 (2) of 
Table 2 defines peer institutions as those with median SAT scores within a 50 (100) point 
band of the focus institution’s own median SAT scores.  Column 3 defines the peer 
institutions using a distance metric – including all private four-year institutions located 
                                                 
6
 As none of the institutions in the sample have started offering merit aid at the beginning of the sample 
period, their “spells” of not offering aid are already in progress.  The proportional hazards model takes this 
into account, assigning all schools the same start date of 1960.  The results are not sensitive to changes in 
this start date.  The estimations also take account of the fact that the “spell” is right-censored for Never 
schools as we never observe their switch to merit aid. 
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within 200 miles of the focus institution.  Column 4 combines these two types of peer 
group measures and defines peers as all institutions with median SAT scores within a 100 
point band of the focus institution and also within a 200 mile radius.  The results seem 
not to be very sensitive to the peer group definition.  Colleges that are experiencing 
slower growth in median SAT scores as compared to their peer institutions are 
significantly more likely to begin offering merit aid in that time period.  When peer group 
is defined only by distance top tier colleges are less likely to begin offering merit aid if 
they are experiencing low growth in their SAT scores.  However, for top tier institutions 
it is unlikely that this is the correct peer group to consider – top tier institutions compete 
on a national scale for students.  Although anecdotally it appears that some colleges, in 
particular lower tier colleges, may be using merit aid as a way to fill their classes, low 
enrollment growth as compared to peer institutions does not have a significant effect on 
the probability of beginning a merit aid program.  Therefore it seems that colleges are 
strategically using merit aid as a way to stay competitive in the market for high ability 
students, and these results largely confirm the common hypothesis for the use of merit 
aid.  
 
B. The Effects of Merit Aid on Institutional Characteristics 
The descriptive statistics in the previous section suggest that for this sample of 
four-year colleges and universities, there have been significant changes in the variables 
describing the student bodies, costs and spending on faculty over the sample period, and 
that some of these changes may have followed the introduction of merit-based financial 
aid by the institutions.  In order to examine this more closely I estimate the relationship 
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between the number of years a college or university has offered merit aid, and the 
outcome variables of interest.  One might expect that if there are impacts on the 
distribution of students or institutional spending, these effects may not be constant over 
time once the school has decided to offer aid.  There are a number of reasonable 
scenarios for the time pattern of the possible effects.  Institutions might have an 
immediate response in terms of spending that over time may fade away as they find 
alternate funding sources for their merit awards.  In contrast, there may not be an 
immediate effect if schools anticipate offering merit aid and have an alternate funding 
source in mind that is depleted over time leading to a need to cut spending in other areas 
in order to continue funding merit awards.  Therefore, it seems most reasonable to allow 
a fairly flexible form for the effect of merit aid over time, rather than to take a difference-
in-differences approach.   
To allow for these possible nonlinearities, the model is estimated as a function of 
a series of indicators for the time elapsed since merit aid was first introduced.  Quadratic 
time trends are also included to account for the common changes in the variables of 
interest over the sample period.  These trends are allowed to differ for Change and Never 
institutions, as the types of schools that choose to begin offering merit aid during the 
sample period are often on quite different trajectories for the time period.  Institutional 
fixed effects are included, as well as time-varying variables such as expenditures per 
student, percent residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common 
application in their admissions process.  In order to investigate how the effect of offering 
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merit aid may differ for colleges of different initial quality, variables indicating how long 
a college has had merit aid were interacted with indicators for tier7.    
Of course there are likely other policy changes being made at these institutions at 
the same time as the switch to merit aid.  In particular, it is likely that these colleges are 
moving to increase their institutional quality in a number of ways in addition to 
attempting to increase the quality of the student body through merit aid.  Although many 
colleges are likely implementing other policies at the same time as their switch to merit 
aid, it is unlikely that there is anything systematic about these policy changes or their 
impacts.  The estimations control for institution fixed effects and allow for differential 
time trends, hopefully capturing much of the differences in the types of institutions that 
begin offering merit aid and those that do not yet, as well as the differences in the other 
policy changes across institutions that do begin offering merit aid.  Perhaps most 
importantly, what we are most interested in examining is how these outcome variables 
have changed at institutions that have chosen to switch to merit aid, not how these 
variables might change if a private four-year college were “forced” to exogenously adopt 
a merit aid policy in a vacuum.  
 Table 3 shows the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations of how 
the composition of the student body changes in the years following the introduction of a 
merit aid policy.  Column 1 shows how the changes in the percent of the student body 
that is low-income, as proxied by the percent receiving Pell grants, has changed as merit-
based financial aid was introduced for the institutions in the sample.  There does not seem 
to be a significant immediate effect following the introduction of merit aid for middle and 
                                                 
7
 Alternative median SAT cutoffs were used to test for sensitivity of results to tier assignment, but all 
results are robust to changing the tier cutoffs by 20 points in any direction. 
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top tier institutions.  However, there is an increase in the share of students that receive 
Pell Grants at bottom tier institutions in the first five years following the policy change.  
A negative relationship begins to take shape at middle and top tier colleges three to five 
years after adoption, and the percent of Pell grant students at schools that have offered 
merit aid for six to ten years is roughly 5 percentage points lower than for these schools 
before they started offering aid.  As the time elapsed since introduction of merit aid 
increases to ten years or greater, the relationship becomes negative for all institutions, but 
the change is much smaller for bottom tier colleges.  Middle and top tier institutions 
experience a net decrease of about 6 percentage points 10 years out, whereas bottom tier 
institutions see a decrease only about 2 percentage points.  Although in the last section I 
did not find evidence that colleges experiencing low enrollment growth were more likely 
to switch to merit aid, there is anecdotal evidence that this is true, and it is argued that in 
this case there is the possibility of actually increasing the share of Pell Grant recipients in 
conjunction with merit aid.  These results lend some credence to this argument as bottom 
tier institutions have an initial increase in percent Pell, but long-run there is still a 
crowding-out of low-income students.   
The introduction of merit-based financial aid is associated with a decrease in the 
percentage of Black students enrolled at colleges in the top two tiers.  As with percent 
Pell, there seems to be little immediate effect, but three to five years after adoption of 
merit aid there is a decrease in percent Black by about 1.5 percentage points at both top 
and middle tier colleges.  Schools in the top two tiers continue to experience a decrease in 
the percentage of students that are Black with a total decline of about 2 percentage points 
after 10 years of offering merit aid.  Bottom tier colleges experience an increase in 
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percentage of Black students of about 2 percentage points after having offered merit aid 
for more than 10 years, suggesting that Black students are being redistributed from top 
tier colleges to bottom tier colleges as a result of merit aid programs. 
 The results show that although following the introduction of merit aid percent 
Black falls in the top two tiers and rises in the bottom tier, there are only very small 
changes in percent Hispanic across the tiers.   Ten years following the switch to merit aid 
there seems to be a decrease of about 0.5 percentage points at institutions in the bottom 
two tiers, and a corresponding increase of about 1 percentage point at top tier institutions. 
The introduction of merit aid is associated with a decrease in percent Asian at the 
institutions in the bottom tier, but no change for the top two tiers.  The fall in percent 
Asian at the bottom two tiers is quite small with a decrease of 0.7 percentage points three 
to five years after adoption and a decrease of about 1.3 percentage points ten years out.   
 One possible way for institutions to increase tuition revenues in order to help fund 
the adoption of a merit-based financial aid policy is for these schools to enroll more 
freshmen from outside of the United States.  International students generally receive little 
to no financial aid and are much more likely to pay the full posted tuition.  Column 5 of 
Table 3 provides evidence that this might be a strategy some institutions are employing.  
Middle and top tier schools experience an increase in enrollment of international 
freshmen of about 2 percentage points 3-5 years following the introduction of merit aid, 
with a slightly larger increase at bottom tier colleges (3.5 ppts).  Percent foreign then 
goes back to pre-merit levels ten years after adoption of merit aid for middle and top tier 
institutions, and the increase at bottom tier institutions falls slightly to 1.7 ppts.   
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 Table 4 displays the results of estimating how successful the practice of offering 
merit aid has been at increasing median SAT scores and enrollment of high ability 
students, increasing the size of applicant pools and the number of enrolled freshmen, as 
well as the effect of merit aid on admit and yield rates.  The results in column 1 indicate 
that for all schools the introduction of merit-based financial aid is followed by an increase 
in median SAT scores for the entering class.  Top tier colleges actually experience drops 
in SAT scores in the first two years following the switch to merit aid, likely due to the 
fact that the institutions in this category that are most likely to begin offering merit aid 
are those that were having trouble attracting high ability students at the same rate as their 
peers, as shown in the previous section.  However, these institutions rebound somewhat 
and return to pre-merit levels and possibly experience slight gains in median SAT scores 
10 years out.  For middle tier colleges, there is a lag with the effect arising about three to 
five following introduction of merit aid, and leading to an increase in median SAT scores 
of about 22 points, a fairly modest increase.  Ten years out this effect rises to 35 points.  
It may be that it takes a few cycles of offering merit aid before word gets out and the 
program begins to attract many higher test score students, or that there is some critical 
mass that must be attracted before the median scores will actually rise significantly.  
Bottom tier institutions experience gains in median SAT scores similar to middle tier 
colleges following the introduction of merit aid.  However, ten years after the 
introduction of the policy, bottom tier colleges have median SAT scores that are only 
slightly higher than before the policy.   
Merit aid policies are meant to increase the size of the top tail of the ability 
distribution at colleges, so perhaps a better measure of whether colleges have been 
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successful in this goal is the 75th percentile SAT score.  Column 2 shows how the 75th 
percentile changes following the introduction of merit aid.  Colleges at all tiers 
experience an increase in these scores following the policy change.  This effect is largest 
for middle tier colleges, with an increase of about 48 points, as compared to increases of 
about 20 points at top and bottom tier colleges ten years following the policy change.   
As discussed previously, bottom tier colleges also likely have a second incentive 
for offering merit aid, to increase enrollment.  In column 3, results show that bottom tier 
institutions that have offered merit aid for 10 years or more actually have slightly smaller 
freshmen classes than before they began offering merit aid, by about 32 students.  Top 
tier institutions also seem to experience slight decreases in their freshmen class sizes 6-10 
years following a switch to merit aid.  For both tiers that experience changes in freshmen 
class size it is possible that the use of merit aid has allowed the institutions to reach a 
standing where they can begin to decrease class sizes, leading to lower student to faculty 
ratios and higher quality education.  It is also  possible for bottom tier colleges that 
although we did not find evidence for slow enrollment growth as an incentive to begin 
offering merit aid, this is indeed the case and perhaps merit aid is not a successful tool to 
reach this goal.   
 Top tier colleges experience increases in applicant pool size six to ten years 
following the introduction of merit aid.  For the bottom two tiers, applicant pool sizes 
remain unchanged ten years following the policy change. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 
show the results for the admit rate (calculated as the number of students admitted divided 
by the number of students that applied) and yield (calculated as the number of students 
that enroll divided by the number of students that were granted admission). There is a 
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decrease in the admit rate, about 5 percentage points, in the three to ten years following 
the introduction of merit aid.  This negative relationship remains over time with only a 
slightly decrease in the size of the fall in admit rate, and a slightly smaller fall in admit 
rate for top tier institutions.  The results in column 6 show that the introduction of merit 
aid is followed by increases in yield rates at middle and top tier colleges, and decreases in 
yield at bottom tier colleges.  For middle tier colleges the strategy of using merit-based 
financial aid to increase enrollment of high-test score students seems to be somewhat 
fruitful given the slight increase in median and 75th percentile SAT scores associated with 
this policy, and increase in overall yield rates.  Evidence is mixed for the success of merit 
aid at bottom and top tier colleges.  Bottom tier colleges experience an increase in SAT 
scores but see a fall in freshman enrollment.  Top tier colleges see only very slight 
increases in median SAT scores, but larger increases in yield and 75th percentile SAT 
scores.   
 Table 5 examines the relationship between the introduction of merit aid and 
tuition, room & board, and the percentage of the student body that is enrolled full-time.  
All three are measures of direct ways by which an institution could make changes in 
order to fund increases in merit-aid funding. Middle and bottom tier colleges experience 
an increase in tuition rates of 2.7% six to ten years following the adoption of a merit aid 
policy, and this effect increases over time to a 6.5% increase in tuition rates ten years out, 
as compared to before the adoption of merit aid.  In contrast, top tier colleges experience 
decreases in tuition over this time period of about 5 percentage points 6-10 years 
following the switch to merit aid and about 3 percentage points 10 years out.    
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 The relationship between a merit aid policy and changes in room & board charges 
is somewhat different from that of tuition charges.  Middle and bottom tier colleges see 
decreases in room & board charges 3-5 years following the introduction of merit aid, but 
this change reverses such that ten years following the policy introduction room & board 
levels are similar to before the policy.  Top tier institutions do not experience changes in 
room & board charges following a switch to merit aid.  Column 3 shows how these 
changes in tuition and room & board costs affect total student costs. For all colleges there 
is an overall increase in total student costs by ten years out.  Bottom tier colleges 
experience slightly higher increases in total costs of about 5 percent versus 2.7 percent 
for schools in the top two tiers.  
Another way in which institutions could increase tuition revenues in order to 
balance increases in merit aid expenditures would be to enroll more full-time students.  
This seems to be a successful strategy for schools at all levels, although the relationship is 
strongest for the middle tier.  Three to five years following the introduction of a merit aid 
program the percentage of students that are enrolled full-time increases by about 3 
percentage points at middle tier colleges and 1 percentage point at bottom and top tier 
colleges.  Middle tier colleges continue to see increases in the percentage of students 
enrolled full-time with an overall net increase of about 8.5 percentage points ten years 
following the policy change.  After the immediate bump, top tier colleges return to 
original levels.  Bottom tier colleges also experience increases in enrollment of full-time 
students and ten years following the policy change have student populations that are 
about 6 percentage points more likely to be enrolled full-time.   
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 Table 6 shows results of the effect of merit aid on faculty salaries and the 
proportion of faculty that are employed part-time.  Bottom tier colleges and universities 
experience an increase in faculty salaries at the assistant professor level of about 5% 
immediately following the introduction of merit aid.  This increases to about 6% ten 
years following the policy change.  However, there doesn’t seem to be a relationship 
between the policy change and assistant faculty salaries at top or middle tier colleges.  
Middle and bottom tier colleges experience increases in associate faculty salaries of about 
5 percent ten years following the switch, and there is a similar positive relationship with 
full professor salary levels for bottom tier colleges in the first five years following the 
adoption of merit aid. Top tier colleges experience decreases in associate faculty salaries 
of almost 6 percent and similarly, average full professor salaries decrease by about 5 
percent at top tier colleges ten years following the introduction of merit aid.  Middle and 
bottom tier colleges are likely trying to increase their overall quality by simultaneously 
attracting more high-ability students through the use of merit aid, and by retaining and 
attracting high-quality faculty through higher salaries resulting in the positive relationship 
identified here.  Top tier colleges may be spending less on salary increases for tenured 
faculty in order to help fund merit aid awards and therefore attract more high ability 
students to their institution.   
 Ten years following the introduction of merit aid, the colleges and universities in 
the whole sample experience a decrease in part-time faculty of 8 percentage points. It is 
encouraging that these findings point to an increase in the quality of the faculty (through 
the use of more full-time faculty members) associated with the use of merit-based aid, 
rather than a decrease in quality.  Although colleges may need to divert funds to cover 
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increased expenditures on merit aid, they are likely not doing so by employing more part-
time faculty members which may lead to decreases in instructional quality. 
 A potential concern regarding the results is that the measure of having had merit 
aid for ten years or more not only captures effects ten years out but specifically for 
colleges that adopted a merit aid policy early enough to have ten years of data following.  
This should not be a huge concern for this particular sample as over 90% of the schools 
that switch to merit during the time period do so before 1997 at a fairly steady rate and 
therefore have more than ten years of observations following the switch.  However, in an 
effort to test whether the results shown here are specific to “early-adopters” I split the 
sample into those who adopted early (pre-1995) and late-adopters (1996 and on).  
Although you cannot identify effects 10 years out for the late-adopters (of which there are 
very few), the patterns regarding changes in the variables of interest in the years 
following a switch to merit aid are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the 
results shown for the whole sample.  Therefore it does not seem that early-adopters 
experienced very different changes in outcomes than more recent adopters. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 An increase in the use of merit-based financial aid by private colleges and 
universities has prompted many questions regarding the effects of this type of policy on 
the socioeconomic and racial composition of the student body, as well as other areas of 
educational expenditures and charges.  Some argue that merit aid will lead to a crowding-
out of low-income and minority students, who on average earn lower test scores and are 
less likely to receive a merit award.  Others feel that merit aid will allow colleges to 
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enroll more high-ability students that are able to pay an amount close to full tuition 
thereby increasing overall tuition revenues which can then be used to increase the 
funding of need-based financial aid awards.  This paper uses data from the College 
Board, IPEDS and on Pell Grant recipients to examine this question, as well as to 
examine what factors cause institutions to begin offering merit aid and to assess how 
successful merit aid is at increasing the median test scores of entering students and/or 
increasing freshman enrollment.  In addition, this study examines how a switch to a merit 
aid policy could affect the costs students bear in the form of tuition and room & board, as 
well as the spending on salaries and full-time faculty which can have impacts on the 
quality of the education provided at a college. 
 Colleges adopt a policy of awarding merit-based aid in response to low growth in 
median SAT scores of their incoming classes as compared to their peer institutions, and 
therefore to remain competitive with peer institutions at recruiting high-ability students.  
The results of this study show that most private colleges and universities have been 
successful at increasing the 75th percentile SAT scores of their incoming freshman class 
through the use of merit aid.  However, these gains are fairly modest – an average gain of 
about 47 points for the middle tier colleges and 20 point gains for bottom and top tier 
colleges ten years following the adoption of the policy. 
 The use of merit aid is associated with changes in the socioeconomic and racial 
composition of the student body.  The percentage of students receiving Pell grants 
decreases by about 6 percentage points at colleges in the top two tiers and 2 percentage 
points in the bottom tier ten years following the introduction of the merit aid policy.  The 
use of merit aid is also associated with a decrease in the percentage of students that are 
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Black at the top two tiers of about 2 percentage points.  Bottom tier colleges experience a 
slight increase in international student enrollments following the introduction of merit 
aid.  As international students more often than not pay full tuition and costs, this may be 
one mechanism by which these colleges can increase tuition revenues to balance the 
increased outlay on financial aid created by merit aid awards.   
 The introduction of merit aid policies are accompanied by increases in tuition at 
middle and bottom tier colleges of about 7%, a fairly substantial increase, resulting in a 3 
percent increase in net cost.  The posted tuition levels at top tier colleges either do not 
change following the introduction of a merit aid policy or decrease slightly, but total 
costs rise by about 3%.  Bottom tier colleges experience slightly higher increases in total 
costs of about 5 percent. 
 There is some evidence that the use of merit aid leads to a decrease in spending in 
other areas, in particular on faculty salaries at top tier colleges.  Top tier colleges see 
decreases in spending on associate and full professor salaries following the introduction 
of merit aid, which could result in higher turnover, and increased difficulty of recruiting 
high quality new faculty members.  Middle tier colleges accompany the use of merit aid 
with increases in spending on associate faculty salaries, which may help these colleges to 
retain and attract more high-quality professors.  Bottom tier colleges experiences 
increases in faculty salaries at the assistant and associate level.  These increases following 
the switch to merit aid may signal a move by the institutions to increase quality at both 
the student level and the faculty level.  At all colleges, the introduction of a merit aid 
policy is associated with an increase in the percentage of faculty that is employed full-
time.  As Ehrenberg and Zhang (2005) and Bettinger & Long (2004) find that a decrease 
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in the use of part-time faculty has a positive impact on student persistence, this move by 
colleges should have a positive impact on educational quality.   
 Overall, this study finds that merit aid programs are modestly successful at 
increasing test scores.  As shown in the first section of results, the decision to begin 
offering merit aid is endogenous.  Therefore, the results show what is happening at 
private four-year colleges and universities following the introduction of a merit aid policy 
but it should be kept in mind that institutions are not operating in a vacuum and there are 
likely other policy changes occurring in addition to the switch to merit aid.  The sample 
used in the estimations is fairly small and selected, so there may be significant effects that 
this study is not able to identify.  Keeping these caveats in mind, it is worrisome, given 
the already low levels of representation of low-income and minority students at four-year 
colleges, to find that the introduction of a merit aid policy is associated with a decrease in 
the percentage of low-income and Black students, particularly at the more selective 
institutions in the sample.  This crowding-out is likely due to an increase in merit aid 
spending at the expense of need-based financial aid.  In conjunction with the rising costs 
to students following the switch to merit, this relationship is something that needs more 
research.  Institutions with merit aid policies may want to consider the unintended 
consequences of these programs, as they seem to be at odds with the current move to 
increase representation of low-income and minority students at four-year colleges and 
universities. 
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Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables in 1987 and 2005 for main sample and by tier 
Variable  All Schools    Bottom Tier  
 1987 2005 % Change  1987 2005 % Change 
Pct. Pell 23.48 27.07 15%  39.97 47.03 18% 
 (21.63) (21.65)   (25.07) (25.70)  
Pct. Black 13.31 13.74 3%  30.93 31.06 0% 
 (27.76) (26.18)   (41.94) (39.68)  
Pct. Hispanic 2.63 5.02 91%  2.65 4.48 69% 
 (5.36) (5.03)   (8.92) (7.55)  
Pct. Asian 3.78 6.02 59%  2.05 2.50 22% 
 (6.69) (7.77)   (9.34) (8.42)  
# Applicants 3467 4490 29%  554 1207 118% 
 (4219) (5292)   (528) (1268)  
# Freshmen 474 546 15%  186 220 18% 
 (467) (519)   (165) (204)  
Median SAT 1153 1174 2%  953 954 0% 
 (153) (195)   (48) (132)  
75th Percentile SAT 1257 1275 1%  1067 1069 0% 
 (148) (187)   (54) (140)  
Admit Rate 58.81 54.68 -7%  83.33 68.71 -18% 
 (23.39) (24.91)   (10.63) (23.93)  
Yield 46.20 40.15 -13%  54.15 47.86 -12% 
 (15.49) (18.32)   (18.95) (25.71)  
% Foreign Freshmen 3.35 4.24 26%  2.35 2.85 21% 
 (3.38) (3.17)   (3.70) (1.86)  
% FT Students 83.24 88.28 6%  70.48 77.09 9% 
 (20.21) (17.32)   (26.44) (24.19)  
Room & Board 6044 7821 29%  4639 5553 20% 
 (1573) (2129)   (1328) (1771)  
Tuition 13750 22348 63%  7113 12855 81% 
 (6184) (8627)   (2679) (4301)  
% PT Faculty 30.38 35.87 18%  34.79 44.71 28% 
 (16.24) (21.95)   (16.78) (22.32)  
Avg. Asst. Prof Salary 43949 52905 20%  32418 40621 25% 
 (11127) (13417)   (7752) (7656)  
Avg. Assoc. Prof Salary 54645 63813 17%  39068 47101 21% 
 (14299) (16985)   (8675) (8862)  
Avg. Prof. Salary 71750 83821 17%  45132 55464 23% 
 (24132) (31053)   (13764) (15341)  
Observations 133 133     43 43   
Note:  Reported statistics for 1987 race variables are from 1988.  All dollar amounts are in 2005$.  Median SATs before 1996 were 
adjusted for re-centering   Tiers are defined by reported Median SAT scores in 1987: Bottom Tier schools have SAT scores less than 
950, Middle Tier schools have SAT scores between 950 and 1030, and Top Tier schools have SAT scores greater than or equal to 
1030.   
 34 
Table 1B: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables in 1987 and 2005 for main sample and by tier  
        
Variable  
Middle 
Tier    Top Tier  
 1987 2005 
% 
Change  1987 2005 
% 
Change 
Pct. Pell 22.84 26.46 16%  12.71 13.94 10% 
 (16.50) (14.64)   (12.78) (5.25)  
Pct. Black 6.82 8.40 23%  3.97 4.64 17% 
 (16.51) (16.50)   (2.31) (2.30)  
Pct. Hispanic 1.80 3.86 114%  3.00 5.94 98% 
 (2.12) (2.91)   (2.21) (3.33)  
Pct. Asian 2.64 4.68 77%  5.55 9.03 63% 
 (5.26) (8.14)   (4.30) (5.83)  
# Applicants 1461 2604 78%  5055 6956 38% 
 (900) (1857)   (4777) (6289)  
# Freshmen 413 515 25%  697 775 11% 
 (269) (302)   (558) (620)  
Median SAT 1061 1111 5%  1273 1327 4% 
 (23) (108)   (87) (100)  
75th Percentile SAT 1176 1209 3%  1365 1420 4% 
 (31) (92)   (97) (95)  
Admit Rate 71.92 68.59 -5%  46.86 41.40 -12% 
 (15.72) (15.76)   (20.18) (21.61)  
Yield 48.10 35.99 -25%  43.20 38.49 -11% 
 (17.40) (16.93)   (12.80) (13.47)  
% Foreign Freshmen 3.45 3.00 -13%  4.02 5.05 26% 
 (3.96) (3.24)   (2.65) (3.15)  
% FT Students 80.82 88.64 10%  93.38 95.63 2% 
 (13.46) (9.38)   (10.04) (8.83)  
Room & Board 5888 7758 32%  6824 8902 30% 
 (1634) (2184)   (1091) (1266)  
Tuition 11742 21172 80%  18624 29886 60% 
 (4894) (5615)   (3285) (3625)  
% PT Faculty 38.72 48.32 25%  23.34 24.17 4% 
 (14.01) (22.60)   (14.07) (14.42)  
Avg. Asst. Prof Salary 40909 49788 22%  52156 62305 19% 
 (7212) (10197)   (6731) (10308)  
Avg. Assoc. Prof Salary 48216 60022 24%  65331 76163 17% 
 (11555) (13721)   (7037) (11613)  
Avg. Prof. Salary 60233 72555 20%  89250 107463 20% 
 (16859) (21923)   (14323) (23336)  
Observations 29 29     61 61   
Note:  Reported statistics for 1987 race variables are from 1988.  All dollar amounts are in 2005$.  
Median SATs before 1996 were adjusted for re-centering.  Tiers are defined by reported Median SAT 
scores in 1987: Bottom Tier schools have SAT scores less than 950, Middle Tier schools have SAT scores 
between  950 and 1030, and Top Tier schools have SAT scores greater than or equal to 1030.    
Table 2: Probability of offering Merit Aid - Hazard Ratios from proportional hazards model estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 50 SAT Pts. 100 SAT Pts. 200 Miles 200 Miles & 100 SAT Pts 
Expenditures/Student 0.803*** 0.801*** 0.806*** 0.803*** 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.067] [0.068] 
Bottom Tier 0.728 0.689 1.163 0.744 
 [0.281] [0.274] [0.696] [0.292] 
Top Tier 0.528 0.519 0.884 0.521 
 [0.250] [0.252] [0.542] [0.253] 
Lower SAT Growth than Peers 2.015* 2.271** 2.697 2.216* 
 [0.829] [0.938] [1.641] [0.911] 
Lower SAT Growth than Peers X Top Tier 0.436 0.482 0.183** 0.466 
 [0.235] [0.261] [0.124] [0.252] 
Lower SAT Growth than Peers X Bottom Tier 0.477 0.579 0.418 0.522 
 [0.291] [0.333] [0.294] [0.299] 
Lower UG Growth than Peers 0.656 0.682 0.899 0.657 
 [0.276] [0.288] [0.369] [0.276] 
Lower UG Growth than Peers X Top Tier 1.342 1.376 1.752 1.396 
 [0.739] [0.759] [0.998] [0.771] 
Lower UG Growth than Peers X Bottom Tier 1.498 1.69 1.187 1.489 
 [0.811] [0.916] [0.671] [0.804] 
Observations 1262 1262 1262 1262 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Also includes controls for Common Application status, and 
University.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Effects of a Merit aid policy on student body demographics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  % Pell % Black 
% 
Hispanic % Asian % Int'l Fresh. 
Merit < 2yrs -0.77 -0.52 -0.047 -0.177 -0.524 
  [1.027] [0.616] [0.242] [0.360] [0.836] 
 X Bottom Tier 3.216** 1.730** -0.103 -0.074 1.899* 
  [1.311] [0.791] [0.311] [0.462] [1.073] 
 X Top Tier -0.247 0.061 0.021 -0.185 1.044 
  [1.302] [0.764] [0.300] [0.446] [0.980] 
Merit 3-5 yrs -2.166** -1.066* -0.045 -0.181 -0.827 
  [1.002] [0.587] [0.230] [0.342] [0.747] 
 X Bottom Tier 3.312*** 0.764 -0.14 -0.612 1.888** 
  [1.176] [0.694] [0.272] [0.405] [0.955] 
 X Top Tier 0.37 0.582 0.378 0.087 1.765** 
  [1.170] [0.677] [0.266] [0.395] [0.834] 
Merit 6-10yrs -5.073*** -1.554** -0.438* -0.327 1.073 
  [1.074] [0.645] [0.253] [0.376] [0.799] 
 X Bottom Tier 4.125*** 2.539*** 0.025 -0.661* 1.293 
  [1.067] [0.647] [0.254] [0.378] [0.870] 
 X Top Tier 0.516 0.515 1.005*** 0.125 -0.527 
  [1.074] [0.639] [0.251] [0.373] [0.779] 
Merit >10yrs -6.141*** -2.192*** -0.590* -0.047 0.186 
  [1.385] [0.836] [0.328] [0.488] [1.024] 
 X Bottom Tier 4.358*** 4.017*** 0.019 -1.138*** 1.681* 
  [1.183] [0.722] [0.284] [0.421] [0.974] 
 X Top Tier -1.504 0.603 0.991*** -0.272 0.128 
  [1.223] [0.728] [0.286] [0.425] [0.881] 
Observations 2493 2251 2251 2251 1802 
R-squared 0.93 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.58 
Note: All estimations include institution fixed effects and controls for expenditures per 
   student, % residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common  
   application, and differential quadratic time trends (Change vs. Never).  
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Table 4: Effects of a Merit Aid policy on admissions and student body characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Median SAT SATQ75 
# 
Freshmen Applicants 
Admit 
Rate Yield 
Merit < 2yrs 12.322 12.413 0.309 9.086 -3.011* -0.498 
  [8.715] [8.949] [13.494] [142.611] [1.799] [1.862] 
 X Bottom Tier -4.974 -10.992 -13.688 50.878 3.007 -3.602 
  [12.325] [12.742] [17.345] [207.498] [2.617] [2.706] 
 X Top Tier -24.536** -16.319 -6.456 -1.043 1.966 2.917 
  [10.369] [10.631] [17.115] [172.390] [2.174] [2.252] 
Merit 3-5 yrs 22.246** 18.433** -12.652 -49.929 -5.020*** 3.361* 
  [8.725] [9.036] [13.420] [143.468] [1.809] [1.880] 
 X Bottom Tier 0.993 6.13 -2.04 238.379 -0.91 -8.568*** 
  [11.043] [11.459] [16.109] [187.054] [2.359] [2.438] 
 X Top Tier -19.330** -5.525 -12.683 119.498 2.808 -3.673* 
  [9.595] [9.911] [16.001] [159.486] [2.011] [2.087] 
Merit 6-10yrs 29.196*** 27.918*** 19.737 -145.356 -5.316*** 3.704* 
  [9.088] [9.397] [14.483] [151.944] [1.916] [1.983] 
 X Bottom Tier 11.379 15.152 -39.886*** 222.124 -0.903 -15.120*** 
  [10.081] [10.452] [14.588] [171.619] [2.164] [2.221] 
 X Top Tier -33.228*** -17.523* -31.137** 391.068*** 3.312* -1.423 
  [8.782] [9.051] [14.661] [146.029] [1.842] [1.907] 
Merit >10yrs 34.498*** 47.604*** 10.96 -58.731 -4.466* -1.985 
  [11.232] [11.647] [19.255] [191.857] [2.420] [2.503] 
 X Bottom Tier -28.495*** -27.672** -32.476** -273.813 0.869 -10.173*** 
  [10.893] [11.353] [16.245] [181.118] [2.284] [2.364] 
 X Top Tier -31.041*** -26.262*** -2.503 353.307** 2.27 5.207** 
  [9.577] [9.907] [16.755] [163.617] [2.064] [2.136] 
Observations 1879 1898 2267 2049 2049 2054 
R-squared 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.87 0.76 
Note: All estimations include institution fixed effects and controls for expenditures per student, % 
residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common application, and differential 
quadratic time trends (Change vs. Never).  Estimations in column (3) have a linear trend only.  
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Table 5: Effects of a Merit Aid Policy on student costs and enrollments  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Log(Tuition) Log(Room/Board) Log(Total Cost) 
% Full-time 
Stud. 
Merit < 2yrs 0.014 -0.028 0.004 1.482 
  [0.016] [0.023] [0.014] [0.961] 
 X Bottom Tier -0.02 -0.004 -0.014 -0.23 
  [0.022] [0.031] [0.019] [1.227] 
 X Top Tier -0.016 0.034 0.007 -0.497 
  [0.021] [0.028] [0.017] [1.219] 
Merit 3-5 yrs 0 -0.108*** -0.028** 2.687*** 
  [0.015] [0.021] [0.013] [0.938] 
 X Bottom Tier 0 0.029 0.001 -1.840* 
  [0.020] [0.029] [0.018] [1.101] 
 X Top Tier -0.026 0.109*** 0.030* -1.851* 
  [0.020] [0.027] [0.016] [1.096] 
Merit 6-10yrs 0.027* -0.082*** -0.001 3.807*** 
  [0.015] [0.020] [0.012] [1.006] 
 X Bottom Tier -0.015 0.02 0.006 -0.709 
  [0.018] [0.026] [0.016] [0.999] 
 X Top Tier -0.071*** 0.101*** -0.001 -2.513** 
  [0.018] [0.024] [0.014] [1.006] 
Merit >10yrs 0.065*** -0.018 0.027* 8.459*** 
  [0.017] [0.024] [0.015] [1.297] 
 X Bottom Tier -0.027 0.014 0.031* -2.195** 
  [0.020] [0.029] [0.018] [1.107] 
 X Top Tier -0.097*** 0.04 -0.02 -7.471*** 
  [0.020] [0.027] [0.016] [1.145] 
Observations 2262 1820 1795 2517 
R-squared 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.92 
Note: All estimations include institution fixed effects and controls for expenditures per student, % 
residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common application, and quadratic time 
trends.  Estimations in columns (2) & (3) have a linear trend only.  Estimation in column (4) allows for 
differential time trends by Change/Never 
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Table 6: Effects of a Merit Aid policy on Faculty employment and salaries  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
log(avg asst. 
salary) 
log(avg assc. 
salary) 
log(avg prof 
salary) 
Pct. PT 
Faculty 
Merit < 2yrs -0.012 0.025* -0.009 -1.271 
  [0.019] [0.015] [0.023] [3.047] 
 X Bottom Tier 0.049** 0.005 0.067** 1.23 
  [0.025] [0.020] [0.030] [4.021] 
 X Top Tier -0.005 -0.037** -0.006 -1.38 
  [0.024] [0.019] [0.029] [3.937] 
Merit 3-5 yrs -0.008 0.041*** 0.018 -1.274 
  [0.019] [0.015] [0.023] [3.068] 
 X Bottom Tier 0.056** -0.008 0.012 -1.139 
  [0.023] [0.018] [0.028] [3.763] 
 X Top Tier -0.026 -0.062*** -0.047* -5.582 
  [0.022] [0.018] [0.027] [3.632] 
Merit 6-10yrs -0.007 0.040** 0.027 -3.018 
  [0.021] [0.016] [0.025] [3.355] 
 X Bottom Tier 0.047** -0.013 0.005 2.349 
  [0.021] [0.016] [0.025] [3.377] 
 X Top Tier -0.026 -0.058*** -0.063** -5.633* 
  [0.020] [0.016] [0.024] [3.319] 
Merit >10yrs -0.015 0.051** 0.023 -8.223* 
  [0.027] [0.021] [0.032] [4.374] 
 X Bottom Tier 0.057** -0.02 0.025 0.113 
  [0.022] [0.018] [0.027] [3.445] 
 X Top Tier -0.022 -0.058*** -0.045* -2.108 
  [0.023] [0.018] [0.027] [3.411] 
Observations 1876 1873 1881 1115 
R-squared 0.88 0.93 0.92 0.72 
Note: All estimations include institution fixed effects and controls for expenditures per student, 
% residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common application, and 
quadratic time trends.  Estimation in column (4) has a linear trend only. Estimations allow for 
differential time trends by Change/Never.  
 
